

# Universal Periodic Review: *The Novel Approach to Geopolitics. Silencing Algerian Voices While Instrumentalizing Human Rights in Resource-Rich Algeria*

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## ABSTRACT

Although the submissions are by organizations, the coverage, choice of use, and frequent use is generated by OHCHR. A comparative analysis of the OHCHR's summary of stakeholders' submissions to Algerian civil society wants and needs reveal two different trajectories. This is due to international interference, and Algerian Advocacy Gap- consultative status. This equips Liberalism theory of international relations particularly the component of Leverage of Nongovernmental Diplomats emphasize collaboration among diverse nations and non-state actors to strengthen international cooperation. To analysis the Algerian UPR Documentation of the stakeholders, Algerian vulnerability, and international interference.

**Keywords:** International Relations, Liberalism Theory, Human Rights Advocacy, Algeria, and Universal Periodic Review.

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## INTRODUCTION


The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) serves as an innovative and comprehensive avenue for addressing human rights concerns within the context of sustainable development goals. By establishing a tripartite system of documentation - consisting of a national report, a UN information compilation, and a stakeholder submission report from OHCHR) - this review process facilitates the exchange of best practices and offers a unique platform for countries to demonstrate their commitment to overcoming challenges in this critical arena. Before analyzing the content, clarifications must be made: The scope of the U.P.R. is five years, and the role of academia, civil society organizations (C.S.O.s), and institutions to submit joint or individual submissions with updates on previous recommendations and current solution-oriented recommendations. The aim is the genuine enhancement of the human rights situation and for nations to showcase their work/improvements and operate on "no naming, no shaming. "The resolution is 5/1. Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council on multiple bases complies with Principle (g) "Be conducted in an objective, transparent, non-selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicized manner." Furthermore, documentation states (c) as information in the stakeholder submission needs to be "credible and reliable."<sup>[5]</sup> OHCHR also ensures all states receive equal treatment and accountability. Figure 1 is a flowchart of the UPR process, with responsibilities, and timeline. For the U.P.R., there are three documents prepared for the national report <sup>[6]</sup>, a compilation of U.N. information (prepared by OHCHR) <sup>[7]</sup>, and stakeholders submission report (prepared by OHCHR) <sup>[8]</sup> for the working group.

These are important documentation as they will be used as a base of discussion until the next U.P.R. and remain an open source for reference. The stakeholder report is constructed by the human rights council using the submissions. Accuracy and verification are crucial here, as this stands to be the voice of civil society in the mechanism. The most recent survey, completed March 9th, 2023, specifically targeted Algerian Activists, former detainees, and civil society on the ground-in Algeria. Due to the "hard-to-recruit group"- Snowball Methodology was used in collecting the sample. This included 77 former detainees, activists, and civil society on the ground in Algeria. The survey consisted of 3 Question; the first was a check all that apply. The second was a multiple-choice question for priority, and third was open-ended question to allow for any unmentioned concerns. The results demonstrated by figure 3below. For Algeria, the OHCHR's stakeholders' summary report contained 15 joint submissions, and 16 individual organizational submissions for the Algerian U.P.R. noted, with joint submissions commencing from JS4. There is an error on that note; the Moroccan organization CIDH submitted a joint submission with Universal Peace Federation, Réseau Unité Pour Le


Développement De Mauritanie (ECOSOC), Brothers Group Organization for Development and Human Rights, and World Humanitarian Drive. JUBILEE CAMPAIGN was also a joint submission labeled as an individual, made with Set My People Free. A joint recommendation breakdown of each submission resulted in 98 organizational contributions mentioned, with 49/98, a staggering 50% being Moroccan or Moroccan administered. Only 11% of the organizations were domestically based in Algeria. While 89% were external-based organizations, 26% were Algerian or Algerian diaspora administered. Furthermore, the 64 paragraphs of content covered a wide range of categories and topics, with the first paragraph providing a background. The most frequently mentioned topic was Tindouf camps conditions; 15/64 (23.4%) of the paragraphs were related to the Tindouf refugee camps, including paragraph 20, counterterrorism, does not list Tindouf; however, the CIDH source used of paras 67-69 references Tindouf, and not, in general, the way the summary does. Another similar error is not easily spotted in paragraph 34; the error is under rights to health. The report states nutrition concerns in the general context of the nation. However, a verification of J.S. 19, the referenced source, that the issue concerns the Tindouf camp rather than on a national scale, as the summary mistakenly reports- making Tindouf coverage 16/64 (23.9%). All the coverage of Tindouf was made/led by Moroccan-administered organizations. The total content coverage demonstrates that 30% of the report was allocated to Moroccan or Moroccan-administered N.G.O.s.

**Survey Algerian Civil Concerns:**

**Questions 1: All that applies**



**Questions 2: Priority Concern**



**Fig 1: Construed by Farida Bouattoura data collected from ADVANCE.org**

**A. Theoretical Framework**

Expanding beyond the realist realm of international politics, the liberal perspective perceives states not as isolated units of analysis, but as entities interconnected with multiple factors shaping global dynamics. Realms such as international legal frameworks, peace-oriented theories, and organizations—both international and nongovernmental—emerge as essential components influencing the broader landscape of world affairs. Liberals emphasize the transformative potential of international organizations and nongovernmental bodies, positing that these entities can effectively mold state preferences, direct the trajectory of globalization, and influence public policy. Consequently, the landscape of power is reimagined, transcending its traditional scope as coercive influence over others. This novel approach to understanding power dynamics, termed "power exception," highlights the nuanced complexities of international politics in the modern world. Analyzing through a lens of liberalism, this investigation explores the capacity of international organizations and governmental bodies to shape state preferences in global politics. Liberal theories demonstrate how powerful multistate formations and nongovernmental forces can be leveraged as political intermediaries for fostering diplomatic cooperation.

As evident with entities such as the European Union (EU) or the United Nations (UN), institutional liberalism boasts an arsenal of useful tools like universal periodic review mechanisms that enable governments to monitor others' compliance more effectively. With deep scrutiny of the European landscape, Algeria's geopolitical position and its neighborly proximity to Libya become more pronounced; thus, sparking much interest regarding Algeria despite far worse situations existing within other parts of the region. Evidence suggests that international interference is highly likely due to numerous coincidences revolving around human rights issues. Furthermore, Morocco has utilized Algerian civil society claims as a disguise for fabricated allegations against humanity- further compounding this perplexing affair with an added layer of intrigue. The theory has seven intertwined components: (1) Democratic Peace Theory argues that democracies rarely go to war and avoid conflict, (2) Rejection of Power Politics Meaning no aggression or threat of violence, (3) Potential Purpose of Cosmopolitanism that all human share morality and all belong to a universal community, (4) Moderator Role of International Law is to operate in international platforms; sign treaties such as

international court, and are subject to its jurisdiction, (5) International Cooperation Considers evaluating power through economic metrics, political liberties political freedoms, and collaborative possibilities, capturing the multifaceted essence of a society, (6) Institutional Liberalism is international institutions like the EU, NATO, and the UN play a crucial role in mitigating global anxieties and fostering cooperation among nations. These organizations facilitate information exchange and negotiations, especially in matters of arms control and economics, thus ensuring compliance and strengthening mutual trust. Finally, (7) Leverage of Nongovernmental Diplomats emphasize collaboration among diverse nations and non-state actors to strengthen international cooperation. A prime example is the United Nations (UN), which actively promotes worldwide harmony by integrating different political, social, economic, and military viewpoints. This final component is of most significance to this article as it highlights, the limitation of Algerian civil society, and magnified effect of external interference due to this gap in structure.

### Seven Components of Liberalism in International Relations




Fig 2: Seven Components of Liberalism in International Relations construed by Farida Bouattoura. Source <https://online.norwich.edu/academic-programs/resources/7-components-of-liberalism>

### BREAKDOWN OF THE STAKEHOLDER SUMMARY REPORT

#### B. Overview

Dissecting each paragraph and topic, figure 2 illustrates topic coverage: Tindouf camp conditions that included judicial executions, rape, slavery, child militia, and enforced disappearances; other conditions received the highest coverage with 15 paragraphs. While J.S. 19 is the referenced source for paragraph 34, the nutrition concerns were raised for the Tindouf camp rather than a general comment as the summary mistakenly reports, therefore readjusting our 15/64 23.4% to 16/64 (23.9%). Moroccan or Moroccan-administered organizations raised all. No other topic received equal coverage as Tindouf or even half that amount. The next topic in the coverage hierarchy was Gender Discrimination or Violence, with 9% with six paragraphs; this included the family code, inheritance, divorce, gender-based violence, etc. Tied at third, with 7.5% coverage, are the concerns of Same-Sex relationships & LGBTQ and Freedom of Religion, each receiving five paragraphs. Fourth was education, with 6% and 4 paragraph mentions. Next in the fifth position was Freedom of Expression, with coverage in four paragraphs.

The sixth position was a tie between three topics, Refugees/Labor Conditions/Human Trafficking, Civil war/enforced disappearances, and Treaty Ratifications, with coverage in three paragraphs with 4.5% each. Kabyle region Concerns & Language, Disabilities & Accessibility, Freedom of Assembly, the Death Penalty, M.A.K. self-determination, Arbitrary Arrest Pretrial detention with two paragraphs mentioning 3% coverage. The next topics that OHCHR highlighted in the report were: Race Discrimination, Corporal Punishment for kids, CNDH's lack of independence, Judicial Independence, Media, Freedom of the Press, and nuclear weapons, each equality covered in about one paragraph of 1.5%. The top individual submission is BCN The Stitching Broken Chalk, an N.G.O. based in the Netherlands. BCN was referenced in five paragraphs: 12, 35, 36, 37, and 38- 7.7% covered. Topics from Individuals with disabilities and education (paragraphs 12 & 38), pregnant girls in school (paragraph 37), and general education concerns in paragraphs 35 & 36. The organization was established in 2020 and covered widespread global regions. It does not specify in Algeria principally, nor is there much coverage on their website (up to Feb,03,2023). The organization describes what they do as "lobbying and advocacy," with the only apparent report on Algeria being a 2017 facts sheet. The submission by BCN also mentioned Sahrawi camps as being the worst in conditions in paragraph 20. The preparer is named on the first page, along with the title, and Algeria U.P.R. March 2022. Further investigation on the preparer, whose name is publicly disclosed, reveals that she was an intern with the title of "web-content Editor Intern," listing their internship from Feb 2022 - Oct 2022, with a start date one month before the submission, and an end date one month before the working group of the U.P.R. for Algeria.

### C. Moroccan Submissions

CIDH AFRICA is a Moroccan organization referenced four times in the report- 6.2 % coverage. Though the summary records it as an individual submission, it was a joint submission with Universal Peace Federation, Réseau Unité Pour Le Développement De Mauritanie (ECOSOC member), Brothers Group Organization for Development and Human Rights, and World Humanitarian Drive. Paragraph 20 counterterrorism does not list Tindouf, however, the CIDH source used paras 67-69, references Tindouf, and not nationally, the way the summary does. Freedom of Expression and Counter-terrorism charges against protesters limiting expression. Paragraph 46, references CIDH (paras.55, 64, 66), raises concern over migrants born out of marriages. The concerns raised in paragraph 46 are about registering out-of-marriage migrants; however, the CIDH source was mistakenly interpreted and excluded mentioning refugees. Furthermore, the paragraphs are selective and present the information out of context. The CIDH framework is focused on the states of Sahrawis, paragraphs 52 through 62 are on Tindouf camps and refugees. Moreover, page 9 of the CIDH submission contains recommendations for paragraphs 52-66, 4/7 are on Tindouf camps and refugees. Also, note that only 2 out of 7 mention migrants exclusively, while the last recommendation on the page is "Recognize children born out of a marriage and grant them legal status to have full access to education and health care.

"This recommendation is culturally stigmatic in a nation that is 99% Muslim, a regional practice not exclusive to Algeria. It is also important to note that paragraph 46 of the summary has other errors, the source referenced states, "Migrants in Algeria have access to the public hospital and primary health care, but in some cases, migrants refuse to come to hospitals for fear not to be arrested by the police for not having legal status" (CIDH para 64)- clearly stating that they do have access. The term "some" as a quantitative description leaves great ambiguity. It means the number is unspecified, Cambridge Dictionary suggests, "We don't use some when we are talking about things or people in general when we have no idea of number or quantity." Also, important to note is that there is no reference or source listed. Some can indicate large or few or even one, which is not clear nor is it "credible and reliable," and can be skewed in any direction as in paragraph 46. CIDH has "some" ambiguity, politics, and inaccuracies. The summary report paragraph 46 also states that "the Algerian government refuses to register." referencing CIDH, the reference states, "Some school administration doesn't accept migrants in primary school for not having national legal documents and in some cases for language and cultural barriers." One language is vague, and the other is exaggerated and misinterpreted with no source. Sahraoui Observatory is a Moroccan organization and was cited in four paragraphs, two exclusively and two with J.S. 11.

In paragraphs 59 and 60 of the summary report, the organization is mentioned on Tindouf camp conditions claiming, "gross violations" further stating "including extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture, intimidation, cruel and abusive treatment." Paragraphs 61 and 62, Sahraoui Observatory with J.S. 11, are cited for concerns of refugee camps' legal status and revocation of the current authority, further claiming civil liberties violations. J.S. 11 is a joint Moroccan collective of six organizations, including the Moroccan League for the Defense of Human Rights (LMDDH.ma), The Moroccan League for Citizenship and Human Rights, The Shumoua Association for Equality, The National Front for Dignity and Human Rights, BMDH, and Moroccan Office for Human Right.J.S. 7 was referenced in two paragraphs in the summary report. Paragraph 55 cited concerns for Kabyle People and their right to self-determination, "the gross violations committed by the State's military and security services." Also, the organizations were cited in paragraph 64 in the summary report for their concerns about the "statelessness in Algeria, particularly in Sahrawi refugee camps." In addition, "Algeria does only deliver passports with short validity to travel for medical treatment or family reunion purposes." J.S. 7 consists of Moroccan or Moroccan-administered N.G.O.s registered in Morocco, France, Spain, and Switzerland, while the Memory and Justice Association (M.J.A.) is registered in Mauritania and has joined several Moroccan submissions. Another Moroccan joint submission, J.S. 5, was cited for four paragraphs in the stakeholder's summary report. Paragraph 15 stated that "internal political instability" along with other circumstances are not a justification for "extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions".

The summary report further states, "Numerous cases of killings by Algerian public forces against Sahrawi refugees have been reported, either by bullets or by immolation." Paragraph 16 stated that Sahrawi refugees did not have enough protection "to investigate extrajudicial executions; to prevent excessive use of force against defenseless refugees; and to bring the perpetrators" and that "there is no statute of limitations." J.S. 5 included Promotion du Développement Économique et Social (PDES), Moroccan administered and registered in Switzerland, and Observatoire du Sahara pour la Paix, la Démocratie et les Droits de l'Homme (OSPDH), registered in Morocco.J.S. 4, also a joint Moroccan and Mauritanian coalition, was only cited in one paragraph in the summary report. In paragraph 2, the organization had concerns about "Freeing all detainee's foreign funding, harassment, arbitrary arrests, pretrial detention, freeing detainees, and freedom of assembly." Algerian organizations made submissions, yet OHCHR chose Moroccan and Mauritanian submissions to talk about the issues that most Algerian organizations raised. J.S. 16, submitted by 12 organizations, were all Moroccan or Moroccan administered. It was cited for three paragraphs (30, 31, and 44) covering Tindouf camps: judicial executions, rape, slavery, child militia, and other camp conditions. Paragraphs 30 and 31 claim the "practice of enslavement of black families" and "7,130 slaves", also alleging that "slaves have died of thirst. "Paragraph 31 asks for "international missions to enter the camps", citing "murdered and missing persons and handing over their remains to their families." Paragraph 44 claims that in refugee camps (not stating Tindouf), "At the age of 5 years the children are sent to indoctrination centers" and "into military training

centers where they are enslaved, abused, trained in the use of firearms and explosives and assigned to the militia." J.S. 16 also states that children are sent to camps in Algeria and some Latin American countries. Paragraph 44 excluded "Latin America" and stated other countries.

Though J.S. 16 specifically cites Tindouf and Polisario, the paragraph in the summary report does not. J.S. 16 included: Il Cenacolo and the Sahara Civil Society Coalition (The Sahara Civil Society), The Sahrawi Association Against Impunity in Tindouf Camps, The African Institute for Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation, Citizenship, and Human Development Association, The Sahrawi Association for Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights, Um AlTunisi Association for Social and Solidarity Economy, Al-Waha Association for the Protection of Mother and Child, Al-Amal Association for Supporting Autonomy and Expanded Regionalization, The South Observatory for Territorial Development, Saharan Association for Sustainable development and the promotion of Investment ASDI, African Forum for Research and Studies in Human Rights, and The Sahara League for Democracy and Human Rights. However, most have yet to online presents or websites as of February 2023. J.S. 19 is another Moroccan submission referenced in paragraph 34 of the summary report. The submission was cited for the standard for nutrition, paragraph 34 states the concerns in a national general context. However, the reference is for the Tindouf camps.

The title of the submission is "Un rapport sur la situation des droits de l'homme au TINDOUF (Algérie)," which is the title of J.S. 19. Yet this paragraph cites it in general<sup>1</sup>. J.S. 19 is composed of 19 Moroccan organizations; the submission states, "At the initiative of the Moroccan League for Citizenship and Human Rights (LMCDH) as an association with special consultative status with the Council Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, ECOSOC." Also stated that their work is "independent of Moroccan authorities, as well as any party, political, ideological, ethnic or religious." The joint submissions JS 12, JS 13, JS 14, JS 17, and JS 18 encompassed a collaboration between various Algerian civil society organizations, such as TharwaN'FadhmaN'Soumer, The Collective of the Families of the Disappeared in Algeria (CFDA), SNAPAP, le Collectif Action-Détenus, la Confédération générale autonome des travailleurs en Algérie (CGATA), and LADDH. Intriguingly, none of these submissions were spearheaded by Algerian entities or submitted by Algerian non-governmental organizations. Adding to the international aura, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights, a prominent contributor to JS 12, JS 13, and JS 17, is registered in Switzerland, Tunisia, and Egypt as a foreign organization. This collaboration reflects a diverse and multi-faceted approach to address human rights concerns. JS 14 Included Ensemble contre la peine de mort (ECPM), Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LADDH), and World Coalition Against the Death Penalty (WCADP). This submission was the theme/ oriented Death Penalty. JS18 also concentrated on the Kabylie region and concerns; both submissions did not involve the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS). J.S. 9 was the only submission exclusively Algerian, from Algeria as well. It was of high quality and specific to disabilities.

**I. Organizations and Interconnections** Open Society's funding has numerous trusts, which in turn fund organizations globally and numerous Tunisian and Moroccan organizations; however, there is no funding for Algerian organizations. They also fund Civicus, Article 19, and Cairo Institute, mainly regional or general grants, yet the organizations have placed an increased interest in Algeria despite more intensified situations in other parts of the region. Furthermore, Euro-Med is composed of a Foundation and a Network group representing 68 human rights organizations (active in 30 countries), the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) (of which Cairo Institute is a part), and the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation Human Rights Defender (FEMDH). Driss El Yazami, a Moroccan national, is President of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation of Support to Human Rights Defenders. He is the Former Vice President of the French League for Human Rights (L.D.H.) Mr. Driss El Yazami is now Secretary General of the International Federation for Human Rights League<sup>1</sup>. UCLA (California) stated that Driss El Yazami is presently President of the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad. He is a member of the Higher Council of Judicial Power as well as the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council.

He was president of the Moroccan National Human Rights Council (CNDH) from 2011-2018. He was also a member of the High Authority for National Dialogue on Justice Reform and a member of the Advisory Commission that drafted the Moroccan Constitution, which did not criticize the current monarch. Furthermore, "Mr. El Yazami was awarded several high orders and distinctions": these included Officer, Legion of Honor of the French Republic, Officer of the Order of Leopold, one of the most distinguished orders in Belgium<sup>1</sup>, and Wissam Al Mukafa Al Wataniya, as Grand Officer, and Wissam Al Arch as Commander, by the King Mohammed VI of Morocco himself. Last but certainly not least, he is Board Director at The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS). Other members of the Board of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation Human Rights Defender (FEMDH) are listed below and oversee "all decisions on grants" and "the implementation of the objectives and statutes of the Foundation." Table 1 is made of publicly available data of individuals in Euro-Med and CIHRS' governance and leadership. Figure 3 is a clear collage of impressionable and political and academic elite: from Arch commanders to Nuremberg Human Rights Prize Winner, to several The Moroccan National Human Rights Council (CNDH), who recently quit in 2018. There is also the reality that from these impressive resumes, some have individual had even consulted the Moroccan Sovereign himself. A highlighting Morocco's impressive web of network, additional to its UN Funding, and 30 NGOs with consultative status, impressive

experience with vast network to branch even in seeming international organizations- clear indication of our seventh component of Liberalism.

### Vast Network and Affiliation




Fig 3: Diagram of Boarder's Vast Network and Affiliation constructed by Farida Bouattoura data collected from publicly disclosed online information.

### D. Migration

The collective of Moroccan and Moroccan administrated organizations' allegations is the only missing category is (d) on deportation-Migration displacement. Amnesty International "urged Algeria to grant protection to refugees recognized as such by UNHCR and to stop the practice of arbitrary arrests and summary expulsions of foreign nationals without due process and respect the principle of non-refoulement". The projects concerning Algeria within the European Union's EUROMED initiative appear to display a peculiar selectivity in their areas of focus. Despite addressing various aspects such as migration and health, migration and the environment, and human trafficking within the EUROMED Regional Action Plan, these crucial topics seem to have been largely ignored in the case of Algeria. Moreover, there is an apparent lack of attention towards dimensions such as economic development, educational advancements, and private sector growth -- domains that undeniably contribute to an enhanced understanding of the migration phenomenon. Additionally, one cannot overlook the fact that the intricacies of relationships between the diaspora and migrant communities, as well as the necessity for in-depth analysis of cross-cutting subjects, have also been excluded from the projects. Regrettably, it does not appear that these projects consider the importance of border management and security, which are essential factors for maintaining stability and mitigating potential risks.

The glaring omission of these topics raises questions as to the intentions behind the choice of areas of focus. Remarkably, these initiatives tend to emphasize on migration dialogues and governance, potentially insinuating that the primary objective may be to steer policy alterations rather than address the immediate needs and well-being of the Algerian state and its migrant population. Thus, it is crucial to evaluate whether these projects' limited scope and potential misplaced priorities genuinely contribute to enhancing the situation for the populations and institutions in question. EUROMED Migration V is an EU project coordinated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). Lead by Dr. Michael Spindelegger a former Austrian Foreign and Finance Minister (since 2016). The ICMPD (International Centre for Migration Policy Development) operates as a distinguished inter-governmental organization, boasting an impressive global reach with a European-centric lens. Armed with a driving vision to shape future migration policies, this esteemed entity holds significant influence amid European migration governance, crafting comprehensive and sustainable initiatives. Furthermore, their prestigious UN Observer Status establishes them as a formidable consultative body, adeptly advancing European objectives on an international stage. Examining the intricate tapestry of migration within the European landscape, Algeria emerges as a prominent player, serving as a nexus for departure, transit, and destination.

The nation has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to addressing the ever evolving and kaleidoscopic dynamics of migration in recent times. Embroiled in a maelstrom of migration-related quandaries, Algeria grapples with issues spanning from unauthorized migration to involuntary dislocation and intellectual exodus. As Algeria navigates these treacherous waters, it finds itself at odds with its European counterparts, weathering a storm of reproach and criticism as it endeavors to further its agenda. Moreover, on the issue of pressure on Algeria, Algeria ACTED is a French organization that works in several countries around Algerian borders excluding Morocco and Mauritania. Their budget and focus on the states significantly increased and shifted to directly bordering countries like Libya, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia. "Historically active in France and the former French colonies," resource-rich nations such as Mali, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Libya, and others. Their board is nearly exclusively French nationals except for one Vice President. The board is composed of prominent French Politicians from the Socialist party, such as: In Africa, France has several bases in Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Senegal. Oddly, France while surrendering its presence in Mali and Burkina Faso, states infected with extremists, moving east to Niger--the fourth biggest uranium producer nation. A move parallel ACTED's budget, which has significantly increased resources to Niger, almost in a predicting

fashion to French foreign policy shift to Niger as financial records demonstrate. Niger's bordering country of Algeria also has large reserves of uranium deposits well.

The southern border of the Ahoggar (Algeria) harbors uranium ore deposits. Algeria is a resource-wealthy state with crude oil production, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, uranium. It is no coincidence that France's foreign policy interest is shifting to focus on uranium-rich countries such as Niger and Algeria. Algeria's Tindouf Basin is west of Morocco and south of Mauritania- rich and largely untouched basin. ACTED is increasingly involved in Libya in with the 2020 budget nearly doubling at a time when a cease-fire and violence were surging. Oddly, they expressed concern for the recovery conditions and doubled their efforts after the war halted. French President Macron visited Libya in 2020, and Human Rights Watch has been highly criticized for its particular interest in Libya. In addition, France's is said to increase its military budget to €413bn (\$445bn) from 2024-30, up from €295bn an increase of over €140 billion, Macron continues with vague propagandist rhetoric "the aim was to renew a military that protected France's freedom, security, prosperity, and place in the world." Odd assertions, as France has a place in France, it faces no threats at any of its borders, no threats to its freedom, and military and war are transparently admitted as a tool or means for French prosperity. Along with increase of military budget and maneuvering of troops to resources rich areas. The reality of Prominent French organization, with political elite, former ministers, lobbyist, journalist, and Chairmen of fortune 500 company- specializes in extraction of crude oil, natural gas, and mining of minerals. It is also a reality that this highly impressive individual is the co-founder of ACTED. Liberalism and the concept of modern maneuvering the shield humanitarian cause into highly convenient locations- and rather to close for comfort to Algerian Uranium rich borders. That Algeria is receiving heavy criticism from EU and Amnesty international, all the francophone NGOs. Figure 6 illustrates French troop, ACTED, and nature resources. This shows a shift to the southeast of Algeria, the Uranium rich area.

#### Algerian Borders, Resources, and French Activity




Fig 4: Diagram of Algerian Borders

#### Consultative Status

Furthermore, despite the recent controversy and difficulty in attaining ECOSOC status, countries around Algeria drastically increased their organization representation with ECOSOC Status. Particularly in Morocco and Mauritania, despite the war, massive national debt, and human rights decline, ACTED does not cover the two countries. Algeria has four N.G.O.s with ECOSOC status; this accounts for only 1.9% of N.G.O.s with U.N. consultative status in North Africa and surrounding nations. Libya has 8, Tunisia 16, Morocco 30, Niger 11, Mali 22, Mauritania 37, and Egypt 32. Though nations such as Egypt have had steady growth through time, having the oldest ECOSOC NGO in the region, countries like Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia have seen sudden, significant, sharp increases in ECOSOC representation in recent years. Egypt, for example, had one by 1971, four by 1996, 11 by 2010, 19 by 2017, and 32 by 2022. Though it did see a large influx in 2021, it has shown a steady increase in organizations attaining ECOSOC status. On the other hand, Tunisia had four organizations with ECOSOC status until 2016, 9 by 2020, then seven more in 2021, and 16 by 2022. Mali had seven by 2014 to 22 in 2021 and none for 2022. Morocco in 2014 had 15 N.G.O.s with ECOSOC status, with 29 by 2020, none for 2021, and 30 by 2022. Mauritania had five organizations with the status by 2013, 28 by 2019, 37 by 2021, and none added by 2022. Chad did not have such an organization until 2015, to 11 by 2022. The peculiar unfolding of events surrounding the attainment of status on this multifaceted, politically charged platform is fascinating: Global Buddhist Foundation from India encountered a demand to label Tibet suitably as an autonomous Chinese region. These are both a few examples of clear political reasoning and skewed

politics. Meaning attaining status is no easy matter, and often it is the organization's state that only accepts some applications. Further examples include Israeli N.G.O.s being deferred and asked questions from Pakistan and the United States deferring a Russian N.G.O. and asking it about its relationship with the Russian Government. The politics in the Committees are a strong reality like the United States expressed multiple years. Several legitimate N.G.O.s have expressed concerns, and several have been denied. Last year, an open letter was signed by 340 organizations and UNA-UK for Committee members to vote accordingly and express their concerns. Moreover, the United States has been expressing concern for years, stating in December 2022, "the N.G.O. Committee has deferred a large number of N.G.O.s," expressing concern over deferring and allowing on the bases of politics. "Because of these blocking efforts, a U.N. official estimated that only about 25 percent of human-rights N.G.O.s eventually receive the consultative status." Yet during that time, Algerian neighbors seemed to have no struggle to attain ECOSOC. Moreover, an ECOSOC NGO database search reveals that many of those organizations have vague profiles and no website or online presence.

### Previous UPR Comparative

Sahrawi and Tindouf camp conditions are by far the most covered topic, and Moroccan organizational content coverage is the largest allocation in the Algerian U.P.R. A comparative analysis of previous years shows no coverage of Tindouf during 2008 and 2012, only a paragraph in 2017 to a sharp spike of 16 paragraphs and the highest mentioned topic (see. Furthermore, U.P.R.s for 2008 and 2012 had no Moroccan organizational submission, one joint in 2017, yet in 2022 50% of the joint organizational contributions to the U.P.R. were Moroccan. It is imperative to note that until the 2022 U.P.R., there were no previous claims of extrajudicial killings, rape, and slavery. Nor were the terms "systematic" or "widespread" used to describe the alleged violations. Consequently, allegations of camp conditions through the question of governance were directed at the Polisario in 2017 U.P.R., in addition, these conditions and mistreatments were "away from any monitoring by Algeria, as the Polisario organization's host country." In their joint submission for the 2017 U.P.R. The Memory and Justice Association MJA/OSPDH did not mention extrajudicial executions, slavery, and or Algeria authority involvement. With several missing or inoperable links, the Moroccan joint submission seemed worried about "the growth of Christianization movement inside the Tindouf camps."

The 2017 U.P.R. and the submissions account for the previous five years, 2012-2017. Based on the stakeholder summary report, one of three documents presented for the Algerian U.P.R. in 2017 had no mentions nor concerns of "systematic" or "widespread" extrajudicial killings, rape, and slavery by the Polisario, nor Algerian Authorities, nor Algerian Forces, no Algerian military involvement of any kind. All and any alleged violation of civil liberty violations have been claimed to have taken place "away from any monitoring by Algeria." In 2022 U.P.R. and OSPDH completely altered their speech and alleged violations in Tindouf Sahrawi camps. J.S. 5 claims concerns over the alleged extrajudicial execution of Sahrawi refugees and more "repeated enforced disappearances, abductions, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, torture in detention centers and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." With its first paragraph oddly adding that international law has "no statute of limitations," the submission continues to be accused of violation dating back to 2010. Meaning three U.P.R.s ago, violations that had no records nor sources all sudden surface is perplexing. The 2022 Algerian U.P.R. Summary report cited extrajudicial execution to J.S. 5 citation 30-33; this repeatedly cited the Algerian army as the violators - J.S. 5 had few credible sources, with many claims with no sources and links that did not work.

The table illustrates the accusation made by J.S. 5, noting 11 unrecorded claims of killings. This is the basis of the allegation of "systematic," "gross violation," and "widespread" 12 alleged killings over seven years by the Algerian army. Of these allegations, 6 took place before the 2017 U.P.R., and none were recorded by organizations who made submissions in both the 2017 and 2022 U.P.R. Furthermore, the submission claimed that there were more but no way of attaining an accurate count and provided lists of alleged victims. J.S. 7, a collation that includes Memory and Justice Association, had near identical wording with the same allegations: "gross violation" was used 14 times in the submission, extrajudicial killing six times, disappearances 14 times, Algerian military 12 times, army six times, and claims "systematic strategy for impunity." These high-caliber charges of systematic gross violations had no support nor credible references, all while defending the state of Morocco in a human rights submission for the Algerian U.P.R. stakeholder summary report - the component meant to represent civil society in the mechanism. All Moroccan submissions (and only Moroccan submissions) made claims of "widespread," "gross violation," "systematic," and "large scale" of "extrajudicial killings," "rape," "kidnappings," and "enforced disappearances." All of which are contextual elements that determine if the allegations are crimes against humanity. Implicit terminology in the U.N. website, R2P, and the Rome statute of the international criminal court. Most Moroccan or Moroccan-affiliated N.G.O.s' allegations are crimes against humanity, specifically mentioned in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This novel approach of Liberalism and international relation renders Algeria's approach to international relations obsolete- as it is vulnerable to international interference and maneuvering. The reality is currently non-governmental organization are a necessity not a new trend that will pass in time. The results from the stakeholders' summary report clearly demonstrates the gravity of the situation, and the magnitude of the gap and the capitalizing of such weakness by international world. The reality is whether the Moroccan and French coalition was intentional or mere consequences of buildup, Morocco does have a strong presence in the international realm one that is exemplary for African and Mena region. This led to strong international relations and 30 NGOs with consultative status.



Even if the roles were reversed, Algerians would have no room to inflict the same false allegations on Moroccan documentation. The NGOs have provided safety a layer of protection, in the new art of international relation, and power of influence. Algeria has had no presence, and this renders it vulnerable to underhanded agreements and diplomacy that it simply could not be a part of. This component, however, needs trust does not control, and a developed strong civil space. This novel approaches instrumentalizes civilian NGOs as diplomatic unofficial envoys, to maneuver more flexible than state officials. There is also the reality that no state is implacable, and human rights advocacy especially political and ideological speech expression, are no threat to any state. It is mere gentle pressure, a means of checks and balances from a cultural expectation perspective. Moreover, this can serve heighten populace confidence in system and institutions, as well as provide a needed avenue of expression that would safely guard from international meddling. The approach, however, needs fundamental respect and sense of national duty from both parties at play.

#### **E. Crimes Against Humanity**

Crimes against humanity have the following aspects: "(i) the act must be inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health; (ii) the act must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; (iii) the act must be committed against members of the civilian population; (iv) the act must be committed on one or more discriminatory grounds, namely, national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. "The figure below illustrates the allegations and allocations to crimes against humanity. All of which the Moroccan organizations have fully implemented in their wording. Hence the recommendations of the treaty by France and others. If Algeria signs the treaty, they are liable to go to court. Such infringement is by no means beneficial to the Algerian public. Furthermore, if Algeria is "unable" or "unwilling" to bend to international pressure, "the primary responsibility for the protection of its people rested first and foremost with the State itself. However, a 'residual responsibility' also lay with the broader community of states, which was activated when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities."The collective of Moroccan and Moroccan administrated organizations' allegations is only missing category is (d) on deportation-Migration displacement.

#### **F. Unfounded Allegations**

In the Algerian U.P.R. working group session, only 1 out of 122 delegations voiced concern over the Tindouf Camp conditions. Meaning 4 out of 291 recommendations covered the topic that the OHCHR's stakeholder report covered most. The Kingdom of Morocco was exclusive in its concern over the allegations of human rights violations through the governance of the Sahrawi refugee camps, which escaped persecution from Morocco. Based on the information and analysis presented above, one can reasonably infer that there are far too many coincidences around the Algerian human rights situation to deny international interference. There's much interest in Algeria despite the far worse situation in other parts of the region. Algeria's geopolitical position cannot be ignored, nor the event that happened next door in Libya. It is also interesting given the heavy Moroccan legal spiel, that used Algerian civil society's genuine claims to camouflage fabricated allegations of severe crimes against humanity; "Respond to the hundreds of communications from human rights mandate holders and treaty bodies regarding the abusive repression of the pacific protesters of the Hirak movement, as well as the numerous cases of arbitrary detention, extrajudicial executions, and enforced disappearances in the Algerian territory, including Tindouf (Morocco)." France recommends that Algeria "Ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Estonia) (France) (Luxembourg) (Mauritius)", yes this rings a far too familiar bell and historical pattern. Should Algeria ratify the treaty, it can be held or rather the "army" since that is who the allegations are directed towards.

The other organization to deliver the Migration allegation is Amnesty International- claiming the only category not covered by the Moroccan allegation. Furthermore, there are unfounded allegations of child militia claims made by Moroccan organizations, supported by European allies. The sources for the Members of European Parliament's (M.E.P.s) concerns are a video that merely shows children in uncoordinated camouflage attire (some just shirts, some all), the kids standing undisciplined and talking to each other with no weapons. Clearly a youth group, but there is also no indication that it is even in Tindouf camps; the M.E.P.s also use a year-old article from a website critical of Algeria<sup>1</sup>. It is also important to note that several embassies, including France and the U.S., have regular access to the Sahrawi camps. Neither has expressed any concerns; furthermore, Staffan de Mistura, the U.N. The Personal Envoy for Western Sahara's ongoing visit to the region, clearly and repeatedly stated that there were no signs nor credibility to the claim. Algeria's Geopolitical position due to its abundance of highly sought-after reserves of natural resources renders it extremely sustainable to international interference. There is a historical pattern of France's use and financing of Morocco to interfere in Algerian affairs, including Tindouf - as the U.S. declassified documents reveal. In fact, "As of 2021, France still retains the largest military presence in Africa of any former colonial power" and is often accused of controlling old colonies. There is also the historical significance that France was opposed to giving up its colonies, including Morocco and Algeria and in both cases, American pressure was needed. Morocco's interference, control, and legal spiel label the Algerian military with claims of crimes against humanity, while France delivers the final recommendation that Algeria should "Ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. "The instrumental tool necessary to serve the Algerian Military- was the only obstacle to such ambitions in the region.

The legality of crimes against humanity would render the responsibility to the state; however, if the state is "unwilling" or "unable" to, their residual responsibility lies with the bordering countries. Meaning Morocco, the closest to Tindouf would bear the responsibility and burden of the natural gas, oil, and mineral-rich region. Furthermore, with the instability of all the bordering countries and the strong French military presence bordering One can rationally infer, based on recent coincidences, historical patterns of interference, and French ambitions, that both the French military, with its doubled budget, and the French "humanitarian" organization ACTED, are founded by the chair of a large-scale company that specializes in extradition of uranium, crude oil, and natural gas- such as the resources in Algeria- are strategically located. Moreover, ACTED's cofounder Frederic Roussel's top 500 European company Colas Denmark A/S, who leads, is quite familiar with Algeria and used to have headquarters in Oran. The company operated in Algeria during French rule and even slightly after. The company "is increasing its presence in what were now the former French colonies, particularly with greater activity in Tunisia." France has increased its presence and involvement in Libya and ACTED approximately doubled Libya's budget from 2019 to 2021. Libya was not alone in financial increase; fortunately, ACTED co-founder Frederic Roussel's top 500 European company Colas Denmark A/S revenue also significantly increased.

## CONCLUSION

Upon close examination of the complex web of Algerian human rights advocacy, one may reasonably deduce that there are nefarious international forces masquerading behind virtuous human rights rhetoric to surreptitiously advance geopolitical agendas. The OHCHR appears complicit in this scheme. Given Algeria's wealth of resources and strategic geopolitical position, it is vulnerable to dubious foreign ambitions and meddling. The results of such interference only serve the selfish interests of external actors with callous disregard for authentic Algerian human rights advocacy and improvement of conditions. All external parties seem to view Algerian interests as expendable to their own. Algerians must ensure all future remedial actions are fully Algerian directed. In the realm of advocacy, a ceaseless pursuit of change guided by the intellectual vanguard is paramount, as they bring forth pragmatic strategies, discerning dispositions, and well-defined objectives. When examining advocacy for Algeria, complexities and challenges abound. It thus becomes crucial to approach every activity with meticulous planning and execution. The recent U.P.R. results, rather distressingly, have failed to accurately reflect the Algerian populace's true sentiments, teetering on the brink of catastrophe, were it not for the illumination of Moroccan meddling towards working group nations. Amidst these ongoing struggles, it is essential to note the singularly commendable efforts of the Algerian-led organization, ADVANCE, which has not only presented a comprehensive analysis in the form of intricate reports and fact-rich spreadsheets, but also delivered these valuable insights to missions in Geneva, even hosting an event. This proactive endeavor stands in stark contrast to attempts of camouflaged ingenuity by other organizations who have yet to venture beyond the realm of dormant intentions. As Algeria attempts to restore equilibrium, it is essential that the authorities understand their heavy-handed approach can be counterintuitive and paints a picture of autocrats easily allowing others to encroach upon Algerian sovereignty. Consequently, exacerbating existing divisions - which have created a gaping chasm in national solidarity - providing an opportunity for outsiders with geopolitical ambitions. The Government must acknowledge relinquishing control lies on the other side of letting go entirely; whilst citizens should foster collaboration between Algerian groups and ask searching questions when determining who they entrust leadership positions to. Of utmost importance: removing any stakeholder report already established Most importantly, the stakeholder report is removed; even if there exists no current procedure for its removal, one needs to be created. All Algerians need to understand that such allegations have no limitation status, and can be used in one year, five years, ten years, etc. Expansion of political and ideological speech, freedom of the press, and assembly are not unreasonable tasks, and the release of a mere 300 detainees that have not committed a violent crime is not mission impossible- and certainly not crimes against humanity. The reality the new approach to intergenerational relation, equips organizations as layer of protection, offence, influence, diplomacy. Algeria has a need to recognize this gap and address it appropriately- currently it is not a choice or luxury but a necessary layer of defense and tool for offence. If not for good fortune on the governments part, the UPR would have had disastrous results.

## IMPLICATIONS

### **G. Organizations and OHCHR**

The discourse at hand encompasses three principal concerns: Firstly, the allegations of crimes against humanity leave Algeria susceptible to global meddling. The intention behind potential interference by other nations remains ambiguous and immaterial, given Algeria's wealth of resources that inherently incite covetous aspirations. Secondly, the foundation of these accusations is erroneous, ascribing wrongdoings to the Algerian military that they have not perpetrated. Although it may be acknowledged that the military exhibits an authoritarian restraint on political expression amongst the populace, it is crucial to differentiate between such actions and crimes against humanity.

It is crucial for Moroccan institutions to remain vigilant and not allow inter-organizational competitiveness to overshadow the paramount importance of fostering harmonious relationships between neighboring countries. The Moroccan King Mohammed VI's insightful perspective sheds light on the profound interconnectedness of "two brotherly peoples," and the necessity to forge and maintain meaningful interactions and understanding between

Morocco and Algeria. It is vital for Moroccan organizations to be cognizant of this inexorable bond and ensure that their actions bear a true testament to the kingdom's position, to prevent any inadvertent concessions to external influences. It is of vital importance for Moroccan organizations, along with the Moroccan administration, to acknowledge and adhere to this critical message. Upon closer examination, international human rights organizations appear more concerned with self-promotion and glory than tangible results or logic. Their hallowed status is not earned through meaningful work but rather through a mercenary approach that values appearance over substance. As such, these ostensibly elite organizations have no rightful claim to lead Algerian advocacy efforts or other initiatives. This is evidenced by their failure to conduct due diligence or otherwise prepare properly in advance of a recent working group. In contrast, ADVANCE sent detailed documentation to Geneva missions two days prior to the Universal Periodic Review, thereby exposing the geopolitical dynamics truly at play. Unsurprisingly, then, only the Moroccan mission issued a recommendation. Any attempts by the other organizations to now spearhead initiatives must be seen as a facade to obfuscate their mercenary ties. The Algerian people would do well to remain wary.

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